Contratação de serviço de limpeza em uma universidade pública federal com foco no resultado: do padrão ao personalizado

Abstract

This research deals with the hiring of cleaning service in the Brazilian Federal Public Administration, regulated by the Normative Instruction SEGES / MPDG nº 5/2017 (IN). The research was delimited in aspects related to productivity per person and the instrument for service evaluation and payment based on the result. Although IN indicates minimum and maximum productivity rates for cleaning services the rates are generic and not adapted to the construction typology and use patterns of the buildings. The IN suggests that each institution adopt its own standards, but does not address how this personalization should be performed. Given this, managers abide by the generic productivity of the instruction, which can lead to uneconomic and inefficient hiring by the Public Administration. Regarding the Result Measurement Instrument (IMR), that is the mechanism used to measure expected levels of service quality and adjust payment according to the service performed, the IN also suggests a generic model. Due to lack of proper measurement instruments, the cleaning services and routines are described in detail by the contractor and the contracted company only complies with the outlined routine. The contractor does not define the expected results and thus, the supervision of services is not directed to verifying quality. Given this scenario, in which the IN determines what should be done, but does not specify how, this paper presents two intervention proposals namely: proposes methods to determine personalized productivity rates and to direct the construction of measurement instruments based on service quality, applied to the case of Federal University of Triângulo Mineiro (UFTM). By adopting customized productivity indices, considering the peculiarities and needs of each space, it is expected that the contract will be fairer to both parts, including a lower contract cost for the contactor, as shown in the present research. On the other hand, the IMR proposed, allows allows the evaluation of service quality with focus on the expected result, linking the payment to the results achieved by the contractor. The model provides transparency and efficiency: the focus of the contract is the quality of the cleaning service and not the detailed description of the tasks to be performed or even the number of outsourced professionals on the task. The contractor s service inspector has simple criteria to evaluate the service performed and the contracted company knows exactly what is expected.